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25 May 1960

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T009754005100210001-1 25X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25 May 1960 25X1 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

India-Indonesia: Major elements of the Indian fleet will visit Indonesia in late June, and Indonesian naval units are likely to participate in exercises with them. This visit, an

`25X1 ′ Approved For Belease 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T00975A005100210001-1 extension of earlier Indian plans for exercises with British and Malayan naval units in Malayan waters, will coincide with the much-heralded arrival in Netherlands New Guinea of the Dutch carrier Karel Doorman and other naval units. Indonesia can be expected to play up the Indian visit as a demonstration of friendship and support by another Asian power against "Dutch imperialism." 25X1 Laos: The escape from jail on 24 May of Prince Souphan nouvong and 15 other leaders of the pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat party will give the Pathet Lao insurgency movement a strong boost. Souphannouvong, the rallying point of anti-government 25X1 "patriotic" elements throughout Laos, will probably try to go to the Pathet Lao command post, believed located in the Laos -North Vietnam border area. His escape will give the Communists added leverage in their political and subversive efforts against the government, and may be followed by a step-up in 25**X**1 guerrilla warfare. 25X1 Guinea: Guinea's education minister stated on 20 May that his government has embarked on a "crash" program to recruit

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DAILY BRIEF

teachers wherever possible, including the Soviet bloc. This results from the decision by most of the 215 French nationals

education minister formally requested American and British assistance in the recruiting effort so that Guinea would not become "wholly dependent on the bloc." Earlier this year the

USSR reportedly offered to provide teachers, and a few Soviet

now teaching in Guinea to leave after the current term.

nationals may already be employed in Guinean schools.

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III. THE WEST

Cuba: The Castro regime informed the American Embassy on 23 May that it intends to build facilities at the entrance to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay to control the entrance and exit of persons and vehicles. The embassy was informed that the purpose of this measure is "to capture the entirety of the dollars" earned by Cubans on the base. The 3,500 Cuban employees at the base earn about \$600,000 a month. The regime will require "documentation" of each Cuban employee, a measure that will permit tight controls over personnel there for political purposes as well.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indian Naval Visit to Indonesia Set for Late June

New Delhi has announced that major elements of the Indian fleet will visit Indonesia during late June and may exercise with Indonesian naval units. The Indian force, consisting of two light cruisers and seven destroyer types, left Bombay on 24 May and presumably will be in Indonesian waters when the much-publicized Dutch carrier group calls at Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian).

The Indian visit is in return for a good-will trip to Bombay in early May by three Indonesian warships and is an extension of previous Indian plans to conduct exercises this summer with British and Malayan units in the Indian Ocean and in Malayan waters. Elements of the Indian task force will also pay calls to Singapore and Malaya.

Exercises with non-Commonwealth forces are unusual for India. While the coincidence of the presence of Indian and Dutch naval units in Southeast Asian waters may be accidental, India's decision to expand the scope of its summer exercises to include a visit to Indonesia and maneuvers with Indonesian ships probably represents as much an effort to provide a calming influence as it does to extend support to a friendly nation.

While Djakarta has not yet commented on the projected Indian visit, it can be expected to play up the visit as a demonstration of friendship and support by another Asian power against "Dutch imperialism." During the past month, Indonesia has approached Asian and Arab governments for assistance in denouncing and obstructing the Dutch plan to augment forces in Netherlands New Guinea and to send naval units on a flagshowing cruise in the Far East. Other than statements of sympathy and cooperation, India's decision is the first demonstration of support which has resulted from Indonesia's ef-

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Escape of Jailed Pro-Communist Leaders in Laos

The escape of Prince Souphannouvong and 15 other jailed Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) leaders in the early hours of 24 May will give the Pathet Lao insurgency a strong boost, as well as constitute a serious loss of face for the Laotian Government. The government now is relieved of the need to carry out the long-deferred trial of these pro-Communist leaders, but this advantage is outweighed by the danger of having them at large again and by the embarrassment the army must suffer over their escape from the supposedly heavily guarded prison in Vientiane.

Souphannouvong and his party will probably try to reach the Pathet Lao command post, which is believed to be located somewhere in the Laos - North Vietnam border area. Because of Souphannouvong's considerable national prestige, his name will add weight to Pathet Lao directives and propaganda pronouncements. The Pathet Lao command structure will also be strengthened by some of the other escapees, who are reported to be key members of the clandestine Communist inner core of the NLHS.

In the past few months, the Pathet Lao insurgents have de-emphasized military operations in favor of propaganda and subversive activities in the hope of influencing the recent national elections. With these elections now out of the way and with the likelihood that the new government to be formed shortly will be dominated by the militantly anti-Communist Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI), the insurgents may step up their guerrilla attacks.

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